). All remaining errors are our own.
Introduction
The literature on corporate governance has traditionally concentrated on the conict of interests between self-interested managers and dispersed small shareholders. Within this paradigm, the lack of monitoring due to free-rider problems is the fundamental problem that a good governance structure must overcome. In contrast to this image of the modern corporation, empirical research demonstrates that rms are generally not widely held (Barca and Becht (1999) La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and ). Outside the United States and the United Kingdom, most rms, even the largest corporations, tend to have a dominant shareholder, while large share stakes and dominant shareholders are a common phenomenon even in the United
States (Holderness and Sheehan ((1988) , Zwiebel (1995) ).
The presence of a large shareholder changes the nature of the governance problem. Unlike small shareholders, large blockholders have an incentive to monitor managers, thereby mitigating the agency problem between managers and shareholders. In addition, large shareholders can use their inuence to pursue their own goals, possibly at the expense of the small shareholders.
Hence, the view that ownership concentration necessarily protects minority shareholders is too simplistic. While large shareholders alleviate the traditional corporate agency problem, they are also the source of another agency problem.
The role of ownership concentration as a governance mechanism exemplies how di¤erences in institutions have implications for the nature of the governance problem. Currently, the relevance of law for corporate governance attracts much attention. This paper scrutinizes the validity of this common argument for the case of outside ownership concentration.
To this end, we analyze the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and ownership in a setting where the large shareholder can both protect and act against the interests of the small shareholders. Our central proposition is that -mpirical studies proxy legal shareholder protection by an index which aggregates shareholder rights and legal provisions that favor minority shareholders in the corporate decision making process, such as e.g., the one-share one-vote rule, the preemptive right to buy new issues of shares, the possibility to mail the proxy vote, the right to challenge the directors decision in court, and mandatory dividend requirements.
outside ownership concentration and legal shareholder protection can be both substitutes or complements. The alleged, strictly inverse relationship holds within our framework when the law is of intermediate quality or when legal shareholder protection has, by assumption, no direct impact on security benets and all shareholders have perfectly congruent interests.
Our starting point is the observation that several parties in a rm, such as managers and active large investors, contribute to the creation of shareholder value. The distribution of corporate surplus a¤ects the parties incentives to make rm-specic investments and thus determines the size of the surplus (Grossman and Hart (1986) ). When contracts are incomplete, empowering one party may discourage investments by others. Consequently, the allocation of power among the di¤erent constituencies in a rm is an important determinant of shareholder value.
As the Law and Finance literature emphasizes, legal shareholder protection a¤ects the ease with which the manager, possibly in collusion with the large shareholders, can divert corporate resources. We argue that there is another e¤ect which this literature has overlooked: the quality of legal rules also shapes the large shareholders incentives to monitor. That is, the law a¤ects the mapping from ownership concentration to monitoring. This is of importance for the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration, because shareholder control through monitoring weakens the managers incentives to undertake valuable investments. Due to this e¤ect, ownership concentration and legal shareholder protection can be both substitutes or complements. For the same reason, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conict of interest between large and small shareholders.
More specically, we consider a rm with a large shareholder and otherwise dispersed ownership. The rm has the prospect of a valuable project which realizes with some probability only if the manager exerts e¤ort. Given that the project is undertaken, the resulting proceeds can either be paid out to all shareholders on a pro-rata basis or transformed into private benets at a dead-weight loss. This decision is taken by the manager, if the large shareholder remains uninformed. By contrast, when monitoring is successful, the large shareholder decides whether to pay out the proceeds or whether to divert resources and share the private benets with the manager. Within this framework, ownership concentration has benets as well as costs (Burkart et al. (1997) ). When the large shareholder monitors more due to a larger stake, he is more likely to control the resource allocation. This in turn reduces the managers incentive to exert e¤ort because he is less likely to extract (large) private benets. Since managerial initiative is valuable, maximizing net shareholder return may require to constrain monitoring Tirole (2001) distinguishes between two main approaches to corporate governance; the shareholder value perspective and the stakeholder society perspective. We do not argue here in favor of either perspective. Instead, we simply point out that several parties contribute to the creation of share value, even when one subscribes to the shareholder value perspective.
by limiting ownership concentration.
Our model obviously assumes that the large shareholder and the manager are distinct parties, irrespective of the block size. In our view, this denition of insider and outsider is not refuted by the observation that many controlling owners are Board Members and participate in management. ! Being a Board Member or even its Chairman is quite di¤erent from being the CEO of the rm, and their interests are likely to di¤er. " This does, however, not preclude that they may on occasions collude at the expense of third parties.
The resource allocation decision, or more appropriately, the extent of private benet extraction is subject to legal constraints. We assume that better legal rules make the expropriation technology less e¢cient, as in e.g., Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2000) . Legal rules also a¤ect the transferability of private benets, and thereby the extent to which the large shareholders interests conict with those of the manager and with those of the small shareholders. Besides legal constraints, there are other reasons which may prevent the manager and the large shareholder from splitting private benets. For instance, private benets may require consumption on the job, such as perks or labor hoarding, or may be indivisible, and the manager has insu¢cient wealth to compensate the large shareholder. The transferability of private benets may also depend on the identity of a large shareholders. Typically, institutional investors (or their representatives) are viewed as being interested in security benets, while a supplier or customer of the rm can benet from preferential transaction terms. In our analysis, we assume that private benets are either transferable or non-transferable for non-regulatory reasons and examine both cases separately.
When private benets are not transferable, the governance problem is reduced to the traditional conict of interest between manager and (all) shareholders. In accordance with the widely-held view that legal shareholder protection and ownership concentration are substitutes, we nd that legal rules and the optimal amount of monitoring are inversely related. Weaker rules enable the manager to extract more private benets. Therefore the managers incentive to exert e¤ort can be preserved even if he is monitored more closely. This does, however, not imply that the optimal ownership concentration also increases. The reason is that weaker legal protection also has a direct impact on the large shareholders incentives to monitor. The larger expropriation threat induces the large shareholder to monitor more which in turn discourages ! Examining the ownership structure of the 20 largest rms in 27 countries, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) document that 75 percent of the rms with a controlling shareholder typically do not have another large shareholder. Concerning the separation between ownership and management, they nd that 69 percent of controlling families also participate in management, i.e., a family member is listed as CEO, Chairman, Honorary Chairman, or Vice-Chairman.
" The Agnelli family is generally considered to rmly control Fiat, the Italian car manufacturer. In 1976, when
Giovanni Agnelli was the Chairman of the Board, the CEO of Fiat, De Benedetti, tried to gain control of Fiat at the expense of the Agnelli. Although this attempt was successfully stopped by Giovanni Agnelli, it illustrates that controlling shareholder and manager are not a team but distinct pa rties, each with its own interests.
e¤ort by the manager. Accordingly, weaker shareholder protection goes together with a decrease (increase) in ownership concentration when its e¤ect on monitoring incentives dominates (is dominated by) its e¤ect on managerial incentives.
This central proposition proves robust to both monetary incentives and collusion between manager and large shareholder. The introduction of monetary incentives makes it also possible to characterize the relationship between legal shareholder protection and ownership concentration: they are substitutes when legal shareholder protection is of intermediate quality, whereas they are complements when legal protection is poor. When legal protection is good, ownership is fully dispersed and the manager receives a wage which increases with the quality of the law.
We want to point out that these predictions are equilibrium outcomes and do not imply any causality.
When manager and large shareholder collude, legal rules also shape the nature of monitoring; they determine how much importance the large shareholder attaches to enhancing security benets relative to extracting private benets. We nd that better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conict of interest between large and small shareholders. When legal protection and outside ownership concentration are substitutes, better legal protection entails a lower ownership concentration. Owning a smaller stake, the large shareholder may choose to divert more corporate resources, even though extraction leads to a larger dead-weight loss.
Our paper is closely related to Burkart et al. (1997) who show that ownership dispersion is a commitment device to delegate some e¤ective control to the manager. In their model, the optimal ownership concentration solves a trade-o¤ between initiative and control. The present paper applies this basic trade-o¤ to examine the relationship between legal shareholder protection and optimal outside ownership concentration, allowing for both congruent and conicting shareholder interests. Boot and Macey (1999) argue that e¤ective supervision of managers is best performed if the monitor, say a large shareholder, is both well informed and objective.
However, while proximity improves the quality of information, it implies a loss of objectivity, as the monitor becomes an insider. The trade-o¤ between proximity and objectivity has a bang-bang solution. Our analysis shows that proximity and objectivity are not necessarily conicting objectives. When the large shareholder owns a larger stake, he monitors more and his interests are more likely to coincide with those of the small shareholders.
The relationship between ownership structures and levels of private benets has been addressed among others by Grossman and Hart (1988) , Zingales (1995) , Zwiebel (1995 (1999) argue that pyramids, cross shareholding structures, and dual class shares are conducive to the extraction of private benets and more common in environments with poor investor protection.
In all these papers, ownership concentration is benecial irrespective of the quality of the law because it aligns the insiders interests with those of the investors. Outside nance arises either because the entrepreneur is wealth-constrained or wants to sell (part of) the rm due to e.g., diversication benets. In our model, the hired manager and the large shareholder are two di¤erent parties and outside ownership concentration comes with benets but also with costs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Weak legal protection may be either due to poor quality of the law or to ine¤ective enforcement (Pistor et al. 2000) . We abstract from such di¤erences and let¸represent the actual level of legal protection, with higher values of¸corresponding to better protection.
The recent empirical Law and Finance research documents that the quality of legal protection a¤ects patterns of corporate ownership and nance. We capture this notion in a pronounced manner and assume that the law is mandatory and puts e¤ective constraints on the resource allocation decision. Thus, private parties cannot opt out of the legal provisions and the law e¤ectively prescribes the expropriation technology ½Á;¸ available to the manager and the large shareholder. This can be motivated by the argument that the law completes private contracts, i.e., lls their gaps: A private contract cannot possible specify all contingencies such as to exclude or limit the uncountable ways in which managers (and large shareholders) may extract private benets. The law through its general principles (e.g., duciary duty, business judgement rule) provides guidelines applicable to a wide range of contingencies, thereby limiting shareholder expropriation (much more) e¤ectively. Such principles cannot be private but must be common (legal) norms to which contracting parties adhere. '
Thus, the present model assumes that managerial e¤ort, monitoring, and project proceeds are observable but not veriable. Legal shareholder protection makes the expropriation technology less e¢cient which is tantamount to making part of the project proceeds veriable.
Successful monitoring plays a similar role. It gives the large shareholder the discretion to make the entire project proceeds veriable (though he chooses not to do so when colluding with the manager). Solving the game by backward induction, we rst derive the resource allocation decision.
Given that the rm undertakes the new project, the manager and the large shareholder decide at date 3 how to allocate the proceeds ¦ between private benets and security benets. If the large shareholder is informed (with probability E), he and the manager bargain over the resource allocation. As the large shareholder, by assumption, cannot reap any private benets, At date 2, the large shareholder decides to monitor after having observed the managers
Rather than assuming ½(1;¸)¸1, we could postulate that the manager holds a small fraction ! of shares. In the absence of shareholder interference, the manager would set Á = Á ! < 1, where Á ! satises ½ Á (Á;¸) = 1 ¡ !.
Better legal shareholder protection would still mitigate the agency problem as dÁ ! =d¸< 0.
e¤ort choice. If the manager does not exert e¤ort, the project is never undertaken and monitoring is of no value. If the manager exerts e¤ort A = 1, the large shareholder maximizes his total return
He receives a fraction ® of the expected security benets which are equal to p¦ when he is informed and equal to (1 ¡ Á )p¦ when is not informed. By Assumption 3, the FOC gives
with @E=@® = Á p¦ > 0 and @E=@¸= ®p¦(dÁ =d¸) < 0. Given e = 1, a larger stake and a lower quality of legal protection induce the large shareholder to monitor more. In the former case, the large shareholder reaps a larger part of the improvement in security benets, and in the latter case, monitoring becomes more valuable because it prevents larger expropriation by the manager. The large shareholders behavior is, however, not directly a¤ected by the extent of the dead-weight loss ½(Á;¸)p¦. Being excluded from the consumption of private benets, his only concern is what fraction Á the manager can divert if monitoring fails.
Given E and the choices of Á, the manager chooses e = 1 only if
The managers e¤ort choice depends on the likelihood of having e¤ective control. Obviously, successful monitoring with probability 1 annihilates all prospects of extracting private benets, thereby frustrating managerial initiative. Thus, the maximum level of monitoring preserving managerial initiative (E NC ) is smaller than 1. Similarly, if private benets are relatively small, say due to a strict legal shareholder protection, the manager cannot be induce to exert e¤ort even in the absence of monitoring (E = 0). Assumption 3 excludes this possibility, and managerial initiative (e = 1) depends on how likely it is that the manager has e¤ective control,
i.e., that monitoring fails. The maximum level of monitoring that preserves managerial incentives decreases with the quality of legal shareholder protection (dE NC =d¸< 0). Better legal protection reduces the amount of private benets that the manager can extract. As a result of the reduced rents, the manager is willing to exert e¤ort only if he is more likely to have e¤ective control over the resource allocation.
The optimal ownership concentration maximizes total shareholder return net of monitoring cost. If the manger chooses e = 0, the project is never undertaken and shareholder return is 0
We impose as a tie-breaking rule that the manager chooses A = 1 when he is indi¤erent between e¤ort and no e¤ort , i.e., when -= -NC .
for any ownership structure. If the manager exerts e¤ort A = 1, net shareholder return is equal
Di¤erentiating V NC with respect to ® and substituting the large shareholders best response (E = ®Á p¦) yields dV NC =d® = (dE=d®)(1 ¡ ®)Á p¦ > 0. Net shareholder return increases in ownership concentration, provided that E · E NC holds. Thus, the equilibrium ownership structure is as concentrated as possible subject to the managers incentive constraint. A reduction in the quality of legal protection has two conicting e¤ects. On the one hand, it entails large private benets and hence an increase in the maximum level of monitoring that is compatible with managerial initiative (E NC ). Ceteris paribus, the increase in E NC translates into a higher optimal ownership concentration. On the other hand, it also increases the Once the manager has exerted e¤ort A = 1, increasing monitoring reduces the risk of expropriation by the manager, and net shareholder return increases in the block size. This gain does, however, not materialize when trading is not anonymous. When investors are fully informed, the large shareholder cannot make a prot on traded shares and has no incentive to alter his stake. Thus, the optimal ownership structure is robust if markets are fully transparent (Pagano and Röell (1998) ).
returns from monitoring for a given stake ®. As closer monitoring sties managerial initiative, the increased monitoring incentives have to be countered with a reduction in ownership concentration.
The intuition for the ambiguous net e¤ect is perhaps best understood by examining the condition for the optimal ownership concentration. The optimal block size satises the condi-
). An reduction in¸increases both sides of the condition. If the response of the initiative e¤ect ( dE NC d¸) exceeds the one of the monitoring incentives ( dE d¸) , the optimal outside ownership concentration has to increase in order to restore the equality.
Conversely, when the impact of a weakened legal protection is stronger on the monitoring incentives, the large blockholders stake needs to be reduced. It is, however, not possible to determine for which¸values the derivative d® ¤ =d¸is positive or negative, unless further restrictions are imposed, e.g. specic functional forms are used. ! (See also Proposition 3 on this point.)
Our result that weaker shareholder protection may also go together with lower ownership concentration conicts with the common interpretation that ownership concentration and legal protection are substitutes. We like to emphasize that our result supports the view that weaker legal rules require more monitoring. As discussed above, the maximum level of monitoring that preserves managerial initiative E NC is inversely related to the quality of the law. Thus, our model concurs with the argument that more monitoring improves return on equity when legal protection is weak. In addition, it o¤ers an alternative interpretation: Only regimes of weak legal shareholder protection allow for close monitoring. In regimes with good shareholder protection, frequent shareholder interference would frustrate managerial initiative.
Proposition 1 di¤ers from the common view in that it explicitly accounts for the impact of legal rules on the incentives to monitor. As weaker shareholder protection increases both shareholder expropriation and monitoring, implementing a higher optimal level of monitoring, i.e., E NC , may require a higher or lower outside ownership concentration.
The identity of the blockholder is another important reason why our result di¤ers, predicting that changes in the quality of shareholder protection may go together with an increase or a decrease in ownership concentration. Other Law and Finance papers, e.g., La Porta AJ =l. (1999) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2000) , consider wealth-constrained owner-managers. In these models, legal shareholder protection and ownership concentration are substitutes; the former reduces private benet extraction because better rules make the expropriation technology less e¢cient, the latter because an owner-manager with a larger stake internalizes more of the dead-weight loss associated with private benet extraction. In fact, irrespective of the quality
NC =d¸is a function of ½¸Á ;¸, while due to the dead-weight loss of private benet extraction dE=d¸depends on dÁ =d¸.
of legal investor protection, more inside ownership concentration is always benecial, as it reduces ine¢cient private benet extraction. Outside nance arises because owner-managers are wealth-constrained, and the inverse relationship between ownership concentration and legal shareholder protection follows from a multiplier e¤ect. Better legal protection increases the amount of pledgeable funds. This enables an entrepreneur with some given wealth to raise more outside funds, thereby lowering the fraction that his wealth contributes to the overall funding, i.e., his equity stake. If our framework is modied into an inside equity model (by removing the initiative e¤ect and by allowing managerial equity), it would also deliver these results.
Thus, our analysis supports the view that legal shareholder protection and inside ownership concentration are substitutes, but also establishes that the relationship is more intricate in case of outside ownership concentration.
Finally, we like to point out that Proposition 1 does not hinge on the adverse initiative e¤ect, but is a more general result. Models based on other costs of ownership concentration could also deliver Proposition 1, provided that changes in the legal protection a¤ect these costs directly. Consider for instance a framework with risk-averse (large) investors. Provided that the variance of the security benets increases following a reduction in shareholder protection, the overall impact on the optimal ownership concentration may also be ambiguous. We base our model on the initiative e¤ect because it captures one important di¤erence between inside and outside equity ownership (concentration). In a rm with a manager-owner and otherwise dispersed small shareholders, neither lacking initiative nor excessive shareholder interference are essential issues.
Optimal Ownership Structure and Legal Protection
We now expand the framework and include monetary compensation for the manager. While the introduction of monetary incentives does not qualitatively alter our results, it allows to make them more precise. In particular, full dispersion emerges as the optimal ownership structure in regimes with good legal shareholder protection, and the relationship between the optimal outside ownership concentration ® ¤ and the quality of the law¸can be characterized. We rst analyze the latter problem of aligning the managers and shareholders interests.
This is an issue only if the rm has undertaken the project and monitoring has failed. Otherwise, there are either no resources to allocate or the informed large shareholder simply enforces that the entire project proceeds ¦ are paid out as dividends. In fact, the large shareholder is unable to commit not to interfere were the manager to extract some private benets.
To reduce or avoid the extraction of private benets, shareholders can at date 0 o¤er the manager an equity stake !¸0. " In addition, they can renegotiate with the manager at date 3 prior to the resource allocation decision. Since project proceeds are observable (although not veriable) and private benet extraction is ine¢cient, such renegotiation is feasible and e¢cient. For simplicity, we assume that the shareholders have all the bargaining power. That is, they can make a take-it-or-leave o¤er to the manager, proposing a reward b in exchange for setting Á = 0. All o¤ers that do not entail a dividend payment ¦ can be bypassed, because the remaining private benet extraction leaves scope for further renegotiations. Moreover, the renegotiated benets b can be conditioned on the veriable dividends, thereby overcoming opportunistic behavior by the manager.
Suppose that the manager is initially o¤ered a fraction ! > 0 of the dividends. When Since renegotiation resolves the conict over the resource allocation, the role of a monetary incentive scheme, henceforth wage, is conned to incentivate the manager to exert e¤ort e = 1.
Given the managers limited liability and the binary project returns, the optimal contract entails a positive wage only if the project is undertaken. Since either successful monitoring or renegotiation ensure Á = 0, it su¢ces to condition the wage on a positive dividend payment. We express the wage as fraction w of the expected project proceeds p¦. Maintaining the assumption that the large shareholder never becomes informed with probability 1, i.e., 1 > p¦, the FOC gives
While the comparative static properties of E remain as in section 3, there is a level e¤ect.
Monitoring is now less valuable because renegotiation avoids the dead-weight loss and the where legal protection is not strong (Propositions 1 and 3) . Despite this contradiction, we do not regard this evidence as a conclusive rejection of our theory for two reasons. 
Collusion
When the large shareholder can tap (part of the) private benets, his interests diverge from those of the small shareholders. Such a conict of interests is another reason why legal shareholder protection and outside ownership concentration di¤er. The law protects all shareholders from managerial expropriation, while the large shareholder stands up for his own interests. He can use his power and information to protect himself against expropriation by the manager, without simultaneously fending o¤ minority shareholder expropriation. & Himmelberg et al. (2001) include in the denition of investor protection rm -level features such as e.g., R&D expenditures as these features co-determine the ease with which corporate resources can be diverted. These rm-level determinants are statistically signicant predictors of inside ownership concentration.
In this section, we allow for the possibility that the (informed) large shareholder colludes with the manager at the expense of the small shareholders. More precisely, private benets can now be shared between the manager and the large shareholder at no costs other than the dead-weight loss of extraction (Assumption 1). ' Since the focus is on how collusion a¤ects the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration, we abstract for simplicity from monetary incentives. Moreover, the analysis in the previous section shows that the introduction of monetary incentives does not fundamentally alter this relationship and makes us condent that this also holds with transferable private benets.
We start solving the game again by deriving the resource allocation, given that the project is undertaken. When monitoring fails, the resource allocation remains unchanged. Having e¤ective control, the manager chooses Á as in section 3. Thus, he appropriates private benets When the large shareholder is informed, he can agree to divert resources and share the private benets with the manager, who is by assumption indispensable for the private benet extraction. Alternatively, the informed large shareholder can also impose the zero diversion.
Accordingly, the outside options of the large shareholder and the manager in the bargaining are ®¦ and 0 respectively. When the manager proposes a resource allocation (with probability Ã), he has to fully compensate the large shareholder for the value reduction of the block. Unless the manager o¤ers ®Á¦, the large shareholder reject the proposal. Thus, the manager chooses and the manager always agree to collude. Given that the manager (large shareholder) makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er how to share the private benets with probability Ã (1 ¡ Ã), the expected collusion payo¤s are
One may argue that collusion between manager and large shareholder facilitates the extraction of private benets, thereby reducing the associated dead-weight loss. Our model could easily accommodate such considerations through upward shifts in the extraction technology. We abstract, however, from this added feature because it does not interfere with the basic mechanism. Crucial for our result is that a larger block entails more monitoring and a larger share of the private benets for the blockholder.
Although our formalization of the resource allocation decision is rather stylized, it has some appealing properties. First, the share of private benets that the manager can secure for himself is inversely related to the size of the large shareholders block (@U M =@® = ¡Á ® < 0). Thus, when outside ownership concentration is relatively low, the manager extracts a larger fraction of the private benets, reecting his increased discretion. Second, the large shareholders interests are partially aligned both with those of the manager and with those of the small shareholders.
While he colludes with the manager at the expense of the small shareholders, the extent of diversion is inversely related to the size of the block. As ® increases, the large shareholders interests become more aligned with those of the dispersed shareholders. He internalizes more of the ine¢ciency and extracts less private benets.
At date 2, the large shareholder monitors only if the manager exerts e¤ort at date 1. Having observed e = 1, the large shareholder maximizes his total return
By Assumption 3, the FOC gives
The large shareholder monitors both to avoid expropriation of his stake and to extract private benets. Reecting these motives, tighter shareholder protection, more managerial bargaining power, and a smaller block all reduce the level of monitoring, because either private benets, the large shareholders share thereof, or the expropriation threat (of his stake) are diminished (@E=@¸< 0, @E=@Ã < 0, and @E=@® > 0). In contrast to section 3, a fully dispersed ownership structure does not prevent monitoring. The mere prospect of reaping private benets induces the large shareholder to monitor, i.e., E(® = 0) > 0.
At date 1, the manager chooses e = 1 only if
It follows from (1 ¡ ®)Á ® ¡ ½(Á ® ;¸) > 0 that E NC · E C . Collusion promotes managerial initiative (unless Ã = 0) because the manager also receives private benets when the large shareholder is informed, albeit less than when monitoring fails. Hence, collusion lowers the cost of ownership concentration. If E C < 1, tighter shareholder protection, less managerial bargaining power, and higher outside ownership concentration all reduce the maximum level of monitoring preserving managerial initiative (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix). As before, Assumption 3 ensures that E C > 0. Nonetheless, it may be impossible to implement managerial initiative because the prospect of appropriating part of the private benets may already induce a monitoring level that exceeds the threshold E C .
The optimal ownership concentration obtains again from maximizing total net shareholder return. In contrast to the previous sections, net shareholder return does not coincide with net equity value, as it includes the private benets accruing to the large shareholder. Provided that e = 1, total shareholder return net of monitoring costs is
Di¤erentiating V C with respect to ® yields
Net shareholder return increases with the ownership structure for three reasons. to divert less corporate resources. In addition, an improved quality of legal protection leads to change in the optimal ownership concentration ® ¤ . Suppose better legal protection goes together with a higher ownership concentration (d® ¤ =d¸> ). Owning a larger stake, the large shareholder internalizes a larger fraction of the dead-weight loss and further reduces the extent of private benet extraction. Thus, better legal protection unambiguously increases the extent Such rules do not really protect shareholders, i.e., do not increase security benets, but merely convert managerial rents into dead-weight loss. In fact, an improvement in the quality of such rules may be detrimental to shareholders. An increase in the dead-weight loss ½: lowers net shareholder return if managerial initiative is no longer incentive compatible due to the reduction in private benets.
to which the interests of the large shareholder are aligned with those of the small shareholders, when legal shareholder protection and ownership concentration are complements.
By contrast, when legal shareholder protection and ownership concentration are substitutes, the indirect e¤ect is running counter to the direct e¤ect. To preserve managerial initiative, an improvement in the legal protection has to be matched by a reduction in the ownership concentration. Owning a smaller stake, the large shareholder attaches more importance to private benet extraction when choosing Á. When the indirect e¤ect dominates, better legal protection exacerbates the conict of interests among shareholders.
Conclusions
The In the extended framework with monetary incentives, we can determine whether a change in the legal protection has a larger impact on managerial initiative or on monitoring incentives:
When the law is of intermediate quality, the former holds and legal shareholder protection and outside ownership concentration are substitutes; when legal protection is poor, the latter holds and legal shareholder protection and outside ownership concentration are complements. When legal shareholder protection is good, ownership is fully dispersed and managerial wages increase with the quality of the law.
We also show that there is a link between the quality of the law and the nature of monitoring.
Better legal shareholder protection reduces private benets and thus the interest of the large shareholder to extract private benets. In addition, better shareholder protection may imply a less concentrated ownership structure to preserve managerial initiative. This in turn induces the large shareholder to attach more importance to private benet extraction. As a consequence, better shareholder protection need not alleviate the conict of interests among shareholders.
An important limitation of the present paper is the restriction to blockholders who are distinct from the rms management and have di¤erent objectives. Inside share ownership is a simple way to (partially) align the interests of the manager with those of the shareholders.
Alignment of interests through inside block ownership is, however, likely to come at a cost.
Wealthy investors tend to be less able and qualied than professional managers to run a rm.
Thus, the union of management and block ownership mitigates agency conicts but involves a loss of managerial expertise, while the separation thereof achieves high managerial expertise Given that e = 1 cannot be implemented in this parameter constellation, the optimal ownership structure is indeterminate and V C = 0. 
